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ARE YOU MY MOTHER? A CRITIQUE OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR DE FACTO PARENTHOOD IN 
MAINE FOLLOWING THE LAW COURT’S DECISION 
IN PITTS V. MOORE.  
Samuel Johnson* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Are you my mother?1  The answer to this question may not have been very 
difficult to ascertain years ago, however it is not so easily answered today.  With 
advancements in technology, shifts in family structures, and changes in social 
norms, new legal issues pertaining to parental rights have materialized.2  The right 
to raise a child as one sees fit is one of the oldest fundamental rights recognized 
and protected by the United States Constitution.3  However, courts are now being 
                                                                                                     
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Maine School of Law.  The Author would first like to thank 
Professor Dmitry Bam for his guidance and advice, as well as the members of the Maine Law Review 
for their helpful comments and assistance throughout the process.  The Author would also like to thank 
his father Gary Johnson, mother Paula Johnson, and Lydia Holt for their constant support, 
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 1.  See generally P.D. EASTMAN, ARE YOU MY MOTHER? (1960).  In this famous children’s book, 
a young bird hatches while his mother is away gathering food, so he sets off to try and learn the identity 
of his mother.  While trying to determine who his mother is, he encounters numerous animals and 
automobiles, asking, “Are you my mother?” to which they all reply that they are not.  Ultimately, the 
young bird and his mother are reunited and he tells her about the adventures of his day in his search for 
her.  
 2.  See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63-64 (2000) (“The demographic changes of the past 
century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. The composition of families varies 
greatly from household to household.”); Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 40, 761 A.2d 291 
(Wathen, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he court has consistently expanded the definition of family and 
recognized that individuals other than biological parents may exercise child-rearing authority.”); Anne 
E. Kinsey, A Modern King Solomon’s Dilemma: Why State Legislatures Should Give Courts the 
Discretion to Find that a Child has More than Two Legal Parents, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 303 
(2014) (“With the increased use of [assisted reproductive technologies], it has become more common 
for children to have more than two parents.”).  This article offers another reason why parental rights are 
changing and may continue to change even further in the future.  “To illustrate how quickly parentage is 
expanding and how necessary it is for the law to catch up, consider the United Kingdom’s recent 
decision to become the first country to allow scientists to experiment with a type of in vitro fertilization 
that uses DNA from three people. The intended purpose of the treatment is to keep a woman with 
mitochondrial disease from passing the disease onto her child. Those in support of this technique 
emphasize the life-saving possibilities; those opposed fear it will open the door to the creation of 
designer babies. Whichever view one holds, this technique will eventually allow for the creation of 
children with three genetic parents.” Id. at 305 (alterations, quotations and footnotes omitted). 
 3.  See Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“[The interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of 
their children] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized . . . .”); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972) (holding that parents have a fundamental right to determine the 
religious upbringing of their children without State interference). Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 50, 761 A.2d 
291 (“A parent's right to direct the upbringing and control of their children is not a right to be lightly 
cast aside whenever the State or the courts think they have a better idea about how children should be 
raised.”) (Alexander, J., dissenting). 
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asked to consider the rights of “legal strangers” at the expense of the biological or 
legal parent.4  One method that a “legal stranger” can use to attain parental rights 
over the objection of the biological parent is the doctrine of de facto parenthood. 
In Maine, there is no statute defining the requirements for de facto parenthood.  
The doctrine is relatively new, and was first recognized by the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, in Rideout v. Riendeau.5  There, the court 
addressed de facto parenthood as applied to grandparents seeking parental rights, 
but acknowledged that other jurisdictions have opened the door to non-biological 
adults who have become de facto parents of a child.6  One year later, in Stitham v. 
Henderson,7 the court acknowledged granting parental rights to third parties by 
noting that a court may give such an award to “a person with significant bonds to 
the child” where that person has more than a limited relationship with that child.8  
Although the Law Court has recognized that de facto parenthood does exist in 
Maine, it has only addressed the issue on four occasions since Stitham.9  In each of 
these cases the court was asked to determine whether a “legal stranger” was 
entitled to parental rights under the de facto parenthood doctrine, but the court 
never established a precise test for making this determination.10  Due to the lack of 
legislative guidance, and because deciding to award de facto parenthood 
necessarily infringes on the fundamental rights of the biological parent, the Law 
Court in Pitts v. Moore11 sought to offer clarity and provide guidance by 
establishing a clear standard in Maine.  While well intentioned, the new standard, 
ultimately, has muddied the waters for deciding de facto parenthood and fails to 
adequately account for the constitutionally protected rights of the biological or 
legal parent.  
This Note will argue that, although the Law Court’s desire to announce a clear 
standard for deciding de facto parenthood is understandable, its newly announced 
two-part standard does not adequately account for the constitutionally protected 
fundamental rights of the biological or legal parent.  The two-part standard is vague 
and allows for too much discretion by the decision-maker, and will ultimately 
result in unpredictable outcomes in Maine.  Employing something more akin to a 
bright-line rule is best when deciding petitions for de facto parenthood.  This Note 
will propose such a rule, which offers clarity in this unsettled area and also 
accounts for the constitutionally protected right of the biological or legal parent to 
                                                                                                     
 4.  See generally Rena M. Lindevaldsen, Sacrificing Motherhood on the Altar of Political 
Correctness: Declaring a Legal Stranger to be a Parent Over the Objections of the Child’s Biological 
Parent, 21 REGENT U.L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 5.  2000 ME 198, 761 A.2d 291. 
 6.  Id. ¶ 40 (Wathen, C.J., concurring). 
 7.  2001 ME 52, 768 A.2d 598. 
 8.  Id. ¶ 17 n.6. 
 9.  See Philbrook v. Theriault, 2008 ME 152, 957 A.2d 74; Leonard v. Boardman, 2004 ME 108, 
854 A.2d 869; Young v. Young, 2004 ME 44, 845 A.2d 1144; C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME 43, 845 
A.2d 1146. 
 10.  See Philbrook, 2008 ME 152, ¶ 22, 957 A.2d 74 (“[W]e have not precisely defined the 
parameters of the de facto parent concept . . . .”); C.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶ 13, 845 A.2d 1146 (“We do 
not address the separate and more fundamental question of by what standard the determination of de 
facto parenthood should be made.”). 
 11.  2014 ME 59, 90 A.3d 1169. 
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raise their child as they see fit. 
In Part II, I will examine the new standard set forth by the Law Court in Pitts 
v. Moore, the Court’s reasoning for the standard, and the dissent’s criticism of the 
standard.  In Part III, I will look at the treatment of parental rights in the courts, the 
changes in family structures that led to the emergence of the de facto parenthood 
doctrine, and the approach to the de facto parenthood doctrine taken by other 
jurisdictions.  In Part IV, I will examine whether the newly-announced standard 
infringes on parental rights.12  In that Part, I will also propose a bright-line style 
rule for de facto parenthood that offers clarity in this unsettled area, and also 
accounts for the constitutionally protected rights of the biological or legal parent.  
II.  PITTS V. MOORE 
A.  Facts and Background 
Amanda M. Moore and Mathew W. Pitts lived together “on and off again” for 
over eight years.13  While they were separated in 2008, Moore had a brief 
relationship with Eric B. Hague, which lasted only a few months.14  Once this brief 
relationship with Hague ended, Pitts and Moore resumed their relationship and, 
some months later, Moore learned she was pregnant.15  During the pregnancy, Pitts 
attended some prenatal appointments and attended one birthing class.16  Moore 
gave birth in November of 2009.17  After the birth of the child, Moore was the 
primary caretaker and for the first seven months of the child’s life, Pitts was the 
sole source of financial support.18  The couple ultimately separated in mid-2011, 
after which time Pitts had continued contact with the child that “focused on 
playtime, with occasional feeding and less occasional bathing and changing of 
diapers.”19  Pitts brought action in District Court seeking parental rights, at which 
time Moore asserted that Pitts was not the biological father.20  A paternity test 
confirmed that Pitts was not the father and he stipulated to these facts.21  However, 
the District Court ultimately concluded that Pitts was a de facto parent of the 
child.22  Moore appealed the decision claiming that:  
                                                                                                     
 12.  Because the use of the de facto parenthood doctrine necessarily infringes on a fundamental 
right, such a decision is analyzed under strict scrutiny.  See Davis v. Anderson, 2008 ME 125 ¶ 11, 953 
A.2d 1166.  That is, it must be shown that there is a compelling state interest, and the remedy must be 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.  See id. ¶ 13 (citing Conlogue v. Conlogue, 2006 ME 12, ¶ 16, 
890 A.2d 691).  However, the new standard in Moore seems to lower the bar for demonstrating a 
compelling state interest, and thus infringes on the biological parents’ fundamental right to raise their 
child as they see fit. 
 13.  Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 2, 90 A.3d 1169.   
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. ¶ 4. 
 17.  Id. ¶ 2. 
 18.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 19.  Id. ¶¶ 2, 5-6. 
 20.  Id. ¶ 3. 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id. ¶ 8 (the District Court found that, “Pitts has made an unequivocal permanent commitment to 
the child and considers him to be his son . . . . The child has formed a bond of attachment with [Pitts] 
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Pitt[s’] role in the child’s life has been short, inconsistent, and devoid of the daily 
caretaking functions that characterize a de facto parent; that Pitt[s’] removal from 
the child’s life will cause no trauma to the child; and the . . . award[] . . . intrudes 
on the parent-child relationship between Moore and the child.23 
B.  Plurality Opinion 
On appeal, the Law Court articulated that the issue to be addressed was “how a 
person who is not a biological or adoptive parent may, over the objection of the 
child’s fit biological or adoptive parent, obtain not just contact or access to the 
child, but the full panoply of parental rights and responsibilities as a de facto 
parent.”24 
The court then noted that defining parenthood involves matters of policy that 
are best addressed by the legislature rather than the courts.25  However, the court 
goes on to conclude that because this area of law is unsettled in Maine, the court 
must provide guidance to trial courts, which will ultimately decide petitions for de 
facto parenthood.26  In 2000, the court first addressed de facto parenthood 
regarding grandparent visitations.27  The following year, in Stitham v. Henderson, 
the court held that judges may award contact to “a person with significant bonds to 
the child.”28  Since Stitham, the court has only addressed rights regarding a de facto 
parent in four other cases.29  However, the court pointed out that “through these . . . 
decisions, [the court had] not yet determined what precise test of de facto 
parenthood w[ould] satisfy the exceptional circumstances requirement of strict 
scrutiny.”30 
While no clear test for determining de facto parenthood was established in 
these cases,31 they serve as an example of situations where, under a certain set of 
                                                                                                     
and his family. A complete disruption of that bond would have an adverse impact on the child . . . . 
Based on this language and [the District Court’s] other findings . . . Pitts is the child’s de facto parent.”). 
 23.  Id. ¶ 9. 
 24.  Id. ¶ 17 (emphasis added). 
 25.  Id.  ¶ 18; Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 142 (1979); Brann v. State, 424 A.2d 699, 704 (Me. 
1981). 
 26.  Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 19, 90 A.3d 1169 (citing Cheshire Med. Ctr. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 49 
F.3d, 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1995)) (“Ordinarily issues of public policy are in the first instance appropriate for 
the legislature’s determination by statute and, if not determined by statute, may be determined by a state 
court of last resort in its decisions setting precedents.”). 
 27.  See Rideout, 2000 ME 198, 761 A.2d 291. 
 28.  Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 19, 90 A.3d 1169; Stitham v. Henderson, 2001 ME 52, ¶ 17 n.6, 768 
A.2d 598. 
 29.  See Philbrook, 2008 ME 152, 957 A.2d 74; C.E.W., 2004 ME 43, 845 A.2d 1146; Leonard, 
2004 ME 108, 854 A.2d 869; Young, 2004 ME 44, 845 A.2d 1144. 
 30.  Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 24, 90 A.3d 1169. 
 31.  See id. (“[W]e have not precisely defined the parameters of the de facto parent concept . . . .”); 
see also C.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶ 13, 854 A.2d 1146 (“[W]e do not address the separate and more 
fundamental question of by what standard the determination of de facto parenthood should be made.”).  
However, the dissent in Moore notes that each of these cases involved a child who “had been cared for 
by a non-parent for a significant period of time of at least five continuous years.”  Moore, 2014 ME 59, 
¶ 65, 90 A.3d 1169.  This temporal requirement is necessary to ensure that the child has become 
psychologically attached to the non-parent and separation from the non-parent will result in harm to the 
child.  Id.; see also supra note 1. 
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facts, de facto parenthood has or has not been recognized.  In Young v. Young,32 the 
court announced that “[t]he District Court possesses broad powers to ensure that a 
child does not, without cause, lose the relationship with the person who has 
previously been acknowledged to be the [parent] . . . through the development of 
the parental relationship over time.”33  In a case involving a similar set of facts, 
Leonard v. Boardman,34 the court determined that a man, although not a biological 
parent of the child, was a de facto parent.35  In that same year the Law Court 
decided C.E.W v. D.E.W.36  There, the court concluded that it did not need to 
address this fundamental question because the parties had agreed that the non-
biological parent was a de facto parent.37 The court noted, however, that such a 
determination “must surely be limited to those adults who have fully and 
completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible role 
in the child’s life.”38  Finally, in Philbrook v. Theriault,39 the court reiterated its 
pronouncement from C.E.W. and added that in each of the cases in which the court 
had recognized a de facto parent, that person had been acknowledged “to be the 
child’s parent both by the child and the child’s biological or adoptive parent.”40 
Despite these precedent cases, Moore encouraged the court to adopt the 
standard for de facto parenthood set forth the by American Law Institute (ALI) in 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution.41  The ALI standard requires that the 
                                                                                                     
 32.  Young, 2004 ME 44, 845 A.2d 1144.  In this case, a man married a woman who already had a 
child, who was only months old.  Id. ¶ 2.  The man was the only person acting as a father to the child 
during the five years the couple was together.  Id.  The couple eventually separated and during divorce 
proceedings, the mother sought to have the child excluded from consideration because she was not a 
child of the parties.  Id.  The District Court agreed with the mother.  Id. at ¶ 3.  The Law Court, 
however, vacated the decision and noted that the District Court had authority to determine whether the 
man was the de facto parent of the child.  Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. 
 33.  Id. ¶ 5 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 34.  2004 ME 108, 854 A.2d 869.  Similar to the facts in Young, a man began a relationship with a 
woman who was already pregnant, the two ultimately ended up living together for several years, and had 
two biological children together.  Id. ¶¶ 3-5.  The woman suffered from substance abuse and the couple 
ended up separating.  Id. ¶¶ 4-5.  The court was asked to determine the man’s parental rights regarding 
the eldest (non-biological) child, and ultimately concluded that he was a de facto parent. Id. ¶ 11. 
 35.  Id. ¶ 16. 
 36.  2004 ME 43, 845 A.2d 1146.  In this case two women had agreed to conceive a child through 
artificial insemination, with one of the women carrying the child.  Id. ¶ 2.  Five years after the birth of 
the child the couple separated, but executed a parenting agreement.  Id. ¶ 3.  The biological mother then 
sought to deny parental rights and responsibilities to the non-biological mother. Id. ¶ 5.  The case 
reached the Law Court, which noted that because the parties agreed that the non-biological parent was a 
de facto parent in their parenting agreement, the court did not need to address this fundamental question. 
Id. ¶ 13. 
 37.  Id. ¶ 13. 
 38.  Id. ¶ 14. 
 39.  2008 ME 152, 957 A.2d 74.  This case involved a woman and her two children who lived with 
the mother’s parents for large periods of time over the course of ten years as a result of several failed 
attempts to reconcile her relationship with the children’s father.  Id. ¶¶ 2-6.  The children’s grandparents 
sought parental rights and responsibilities of the children under the doctrine of de facto parenthood.  Id. 
¶ 7.  The Law Court ultimately determined that the grandparents did not satisfy the requirements for de 
facto parenthood.  Id. ¶ 26. 
 40.  Id. ¶ 23. 
 41.  § 2.03(1)(c) (2002).  In this model statute, the ALI defines a de facto parent by the following 
criteria: 
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de facto parent has lived with the child for a time not less than two years; with the 
consent of the legal parent, formed a parent-child relationship; and [has] regularly 
performed a majority of the caretaking functions, or a share of the caretaking 
functions at least as great as that of the legal parent.42  The court considered and 
rejected this standard for de facto parenthood.43  The plurality opinion concluded 
that the legislature may choose to adopt some or all of the standards set forth by the 
ALI, but until such time that the legislature takes action, the court declined to adopt 
these standards.44 
In order to offer clarity and guidance, the court announced its new standard.45  
Where an individual is seeking to be deemed a de facto parent, the individual must 
demonstrate that, “(1) he or she has undertaken a ‘permanent, unequivocal, 
committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life,’ and (2) that there are 
exceptional circumstances sufficient to allow the court to interfere with the legal or 
adoptive parents’ rights.”46   
Discussing the first prong of the new standard, the court noted that it chose to 
define a “permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role” by 
looking to elements of de facto parenthood employed in Massachusetts.47  
According to the Massachusetts court, “[t]he de facto parent resides with the child 
and, with the consent and encouragement of the legal parent, performs a share of 
the caretaking functions . . . .”48  The court stated that this language will provide 
courts and litigants with the necessary elements “for determining whether an 
individual’s relationship with a child is permanent, unequivocal, committed, and 
responsible.”49  The court further reasoned that the test requires not only that a 
petitioner establish that they resided with the child as a member of the family, but 
also that the petitioner partook in caretaking functions, not merely parenting 
functions.50  The plurality opinion noted, however, that while the Massachusetts 
                                                                                                     
(c) a de facto parent is an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel 
who, for a significant period of time not less than two years 
(i) lived with the child and, 
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with agreement of a 
legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a complete failure or 
inability of any legal parent to perform care taking functions, 
(A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the 
child, or 
(B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as 
that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 26, 90 A.3d 1169. 
 44.  Id. (“[I]f and when the Legislature ventures into this area, it may choose to adopt some or all of 
the ALI standards.”). 
 45.  Id. ¶ 19 (“In the absence of Legislative action in such an important and unsettled area . . . we 
must provide some guidance to trial courts faced with de facto parenthood petitions.”). 
 46.  Id. ¶ 27 (citations omitted). 
 47.  Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 28, 90 A.3d 1169.  See also E.N.O v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 
1999). 
 48.  E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891. 
 49.  Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 28, 90 A.3d 1169. 
 50.  See id.  The court distinguished between parenting functions, which it deemed to be an 
umbrella term that may provide benefit to the child but ultimately require little or no direct involvement, 
and caretaking functions, which require direct delivery of day-to-day care and can include activities 
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standard required showing a caretaking function equal to or greater than that of the 
biological parent, the new standard in Maine does not impose such a high bar.51  
Discussing the second prong of the new standard, the plurality opinion noted 
that to establish an exceptional circumstance, and thus obtain the full panoply of 
rights and responsibilities, the petitioner must show by clear and convincing 
evidence that harm to the child will occur if he or she is not awarded de facto 
parenthood.52  The court went on to state that “contemplating an order that makes a 
parent out of a non-parent” will require a showing of a substantial negative effect 
on the child by removal of the person who has undertaken “a permanent, 
unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role” in that child’s life.53  
Finally, the Law Court noted that an award of de facto parenthood establishes 
that the petitioner has the same parental rights and responsibilities as a biological or 
adoptive parent.54  The court reiterated that “once a court finds that a party is a de 
facto parent, that party is a parent for all purposes, and the court must then go on to 
consider the appropriate award of parental rights and responsibilities . . . .”55  The 
plurality opinion then set out a three-part procedure for determining the rights and 
responsibilities of someone petitioning for de facto parenthood.56  First, the party 
must establish a prima facie showing of de facto parenthood in light of the new 
two-part standard announced by the court.57  Second, the petitioner must then 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the new two-part standard 
announced by the court has been satisfied.58  Finally, if de facto parenthood is 
established pursuant to the new standard, the court must determine the extent of the 
de facto parents’ rights pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653.59  The parental rights 
determination is made using a preponderance of the evidence standard after the 
petitioner has established that he or she is in fact the child’s de facto parent.60  The 
court noted that the best interests of the child will guide the determination of the de 
facto parents’ rights and responsibilities. 61   
Because this was the first articulation of the new two-part standard, the court 
remanded to allow the lower court to apply the newly established test.62  On 
remand, the lower court was instructed to consider the evidence submitted by Pitts 
                                                                                                     
such as bathing, feeding, and physical supervision.  See id.; see also A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 
1071-72 (Mass. 2006) (noting that a parent-child bond grows by the adult tending to the child through 
hands-on activities). 
 51.  Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 28 n.14, 90 A.3d 1169. 
 52.  Id. ¶ 29 (“[An exceptional circumstance will occur] only when the non-parent can establish, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that harm to the child will occur if he or she is not acknowledged to be 
the child’s de facto parent.”). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. ¶ 30 (“[A] de facto parent . . . is a parent on equal footing with a biological parent or 
adoptive parent . . . .”). 
 55.  Id. ¶ 32. 
 56.  Id. ¶¶ 35-37. 
 57.  Id. ¶ 35. 
 58.  Id. ¶ 36. 
 59.  Id. ¶ 37. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. ¶ 38. The court noted that the best interests of the child is determined by a balancing of the 
nineteen factors set forth in 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(3).  Id. 
 62.  Id. ¶ 40. 
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in light of this new standard, and determine whether or not he meets the 
requirements for de facto parenthood.63 
C.  Dissent 
Justice Levy,64 joined by Justice Alexander, wrote the dissenting opinion.  At 
the outset, Justice Levy acknowledged the court’s good intentions to offer clarity in 
an area where there has been no legislatively declared policy.65  However, the 
dissent noted that the court’s “prior decisions provide sufficient guidance . . . to 
conclude that Pitts failed to prove his status as a de facto parent.”66  The dissent 
then addressed the constitutional requirement of harm, critiqued the new standard 
announced by the court, and explained why Pitts failed to prove his de facto parent 
status under existing precedent.67 
The dissent first noted that because a decision to award de facto parenthood 
necessarily infringes on a biological parents’ constitutionally protected rights—to 
satisfy strict scrutiny—the state must demonstrate that harm or threat to the child 
will occur absent the award in order to constitute a compelling state interest.68  
Essentially, a failure to award de facto parenthood must result in consequences 
“sufficiently serious [to] the child’s long-term physical, emotional, or 
developmental well-being.”69  The dissent further noted that the new standard 
established by the plurality opinion has no temporal requirement.70  A “temporal . . 
. requirement ensures that de facto parent claims are limited to those cases in which 
it is probable that the child has become psychologically attached to the person 
claiming de facto parent status.”71  In each of the court’s five prior de facto 
parenthood cases, a non-parent cared for the child for at least five continuous 
years.72  The dissent also pointed out that the ALI model statute suggests that a de 
facto parent is “an individual who has lived with the child for a significant period 
of time not less than two years.”73  Ultimately, the dissent seemed to indicate that a 
temporal requirement may be a necessary element for establishing that harm would 
                                                                                                     
 63.  Id. ¶ 41.  Justice Jabar was joined by Justice Silver in a concurring opinion.  Id. ¶ 42.  The 
Justices noted that they joined the plurality opinion with regards to its efforts to offer clarity in this 
unsettled area of the law and with its ultimate result.  Id.  However they wrote separately because they 
did not agree that harm to the child was “constitutionally required in order to obtain de-facto-parenthood 
status over a fit parent’s objection.  Id.  Because this Note focuses on the test established by the plurality 
opinion, the concurring opinion is not discussed further. 
 64.  Now Judge Levy, serving on the United States Federal District Court for the District of Maine. 
 65.  Moore,  2014 ME 59, ¶ 59, 90 A.3d 1169 
 66.  Id.  
 67.  Id. ¶ 60. 
 68.  Id. ¶¶ 61-62 (“[C]ourts may interfere with a parents lawful right to prevent his or her child from 
having a relationship with a person seeking de facto parenthood only if measurable harm would befall 
the child on the disruption of that relationship.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also infra III.A. 
 69.  Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 63, 90 A.3d 1169 
 70.  Id. ¶ 68. 
 71.  Id. ¶ 65.  
 72.  Id.; see Philbrook, 2008 ME 152, ¶ 12, 957 A.2d 74 (nine years); C.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶¶ 1-4, 
845 A.2d 1146 (nine years); Leonard, 2004 ME 108, ¶ 16, 854 A.2d 869 (eight years); Young, 2004 ME 
44, ¶ 2, 845 A.2d 1144 (five years); Stitham, 2001 ME 52, ¶ 2, 768 A.2d 598 (five years). 
 73.  Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 65, 90 A.3d 1169. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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occur to the child but for an award of de facto parenthood. 
The dissent next set out a five-part critique of the new standard announced by 
the court.74  First, the dissent argued that the plurality opinion’s “negative effect” 
standard is vague and possibly unconstitutional.75  This standard of harm, the 
dissent suggested, is merely a “different way of asking whether an award of de 
facto parent status to a nonparent would be in the best interests of the child.”76  The 
dissent noted that the United States Supreme Court in Troxel77 deemed a “best 
interest of the child standard [to be] constitutionally insufficient to support judicial 
interference with a parents’ rights.”78   
Second, the dissent argued that the new standard does not recognize any 
minimum temporal requirement.79  According to the dissent, the lack of a temporal 
requirement disregards precedent by deemphasizing the requirement that, “for a 
court to review a fit parent’s decisions to exclude a nonparent from the child’s life, 
it must be shown that the nonparent acted as a ‘primary caregiver and custodian for 
[the] child over a significant period of time.’”80   
Third, the dissent noted that in establishing the new standard, the plurality 
opinion distinguished between “parenting functions” and “care taking functions.”81  
In doing so, the court was essentially embracing a distinction made in the ALI 
model statute regarding de facto parents but which effectively excludes those who 
would be considered a “parent by estoppel” pursuant to § 2.03(1)(b).82  The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has said that in applying the ALI principles, 
parents by estoppel are awarded the full panoply of parental rights, but de facto 
                                                                                                     
 74.  Id. ¶¶ 67-71. 
 75.  Id. ¶ 67. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 78.  Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 68, 90 A.3d 1169 (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67-73). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. (quoting Rideout, 2000 ME 198 ¶ 27, 761 A.2d 291). 
 81.  Id. ¶¶ 28, 69. 
 82.  ALI Principles (2002). § 2.03(1)(b) provides: 
A parent by estoppel is an individual who, though not a legal parent, 
(i) is obligated to pay child support under Chapter 3; or 
(ii) lived with the child for at least two years and 
(A) over that period had a reasonable, good-faith belief that he was the 
child’s biological father, based on marriage to the mother or on the actions 
or representations of the mother, and fully accepted parental 
responsibilities consistent with that belief, and 
(B) if some time thereafter that belief no longer existed, continued to make 
reasonable, good-faith efforts to accept responsibilities as the child’s 
father; or 
(iii) lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting full and 
permanent responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the 
child’s legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise a child 
together each with full parental rights and responsibilities, when the court finds that 
recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests; or 
(iv) lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting full and 
permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement with the child’s parent 
(or, if there are two legal parents, both parents), when the court finds that recognition of 
the individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests. 
2015] PITTS V. MOORE 363 
parents are not83  This is important because it leaves the state of the law in Maine 
“confused in relation to both the law of Massachusetts, on which the plurality 
opinion is ostensibly based, and the ALI Principles,”84 which the court had stated 
that it declined to adopt.85   
Fourth, the dissent took issue with the plurality opinion’s treatment of how a 
non-parent establishes a “permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible role 
in the child’s life.”86  Most notably, the dissent highlighted that the plurality 
opinion had adopted the definition of de facto parenthood as established by the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, but then only used part of the definition, 
which resulted in a less demanding standard in Maine.87  Although the court quoted 
that a de facto parent “resides with the child and, with the consent and 
encouragement of the legal parent, performs a share of the caretaking functions,”88 
it excised the last part of this sentence, which reads: “at least as great as the legal 
parent.89  The dissent noted that the plurality opinion tried to explain this omission 
away in a footnote by stating, “we do not set the bar so high for this portion of the 
de facto parenthood standard,”90 yet it offered no explanation as to why a less 
demanding approach was appropriate for Maine.91   
Fifth, the dissent argued that the plurality opinion failed to explain why it 
adopted the less stringent preponderance of the evidence burden of proof instead of 
the more stringent clear and convincing evidence burden of proof in determining 
parental rights based on the best interests of the child.92  The plurality opinion 
stated that this determination is generally made after a petitioner has established 
that he or she is the de facto parent, which essentially divorces the best interests of 
the child question from the question of whether the petitioner should be a de facto 
parent at all.93  To demonstrate this issue, the dissent offered the following 
example: “a non-parent who may have had a permanent, unequivocal, committed, 
and responsible parental role in the child’s life in the past, but whose continued 
presence in the child’s life will be detrimental to the child, may nonetheless be 
entitled to a declaration of de facto parenthood.”94 
Lastly, the dissent argued that this case could have and should have been 
decided under Maine’s existing precedent.95  Pitts resided with the child for only 
eleven months, which is far less than the two years required by the ALI Principles, 
and falls far short of the five or more years established in the court’s recent 
decisions.96  Pitts was unable to establish that he was the child’s primary caregiver 
                                                                                                     
 83.  A.H. v. M.P, N.E.2d 1061, 1073 (Mass. 2006). 
 84.  Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 69, 90 A.3d 1169 
 85.  Id. ¶ 26. 
 86.  Id. ¶ 70. 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id. ¶ 28 (quoting E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999)). 
 89.  Id. ¶ 70. 
 90.  Id. ¶ 28 n.14. 
 91.  Id. ¶ 70. 
 92.  Id. ¶ 71. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. ¶ 73. 
 96.  Id. ¶ 74. 
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during those eleven months.97  Further, Pitts failed to establish that harm or threat 
of harm would result to the child if Moore’s decision to restrict contact were 
allowed.98  Finally, the dissent noted that Pitts “failed to demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that any award of parental rights and responsibilities . . . is in 
the best interest of the child.”99  Therefore, the dissent reasoned that because Pitts 
was unable to establish that he was suited for parental responsibilities, it did not 
follow that he qualified as the child’s de facto parent.100 
III.  OVERVIEW OF DE FACTO PARENTHOOD 
As can be seen from the decision in Pitts v. Moore,101 awarding de facto 
parenthood has significant implications.  Of primary importance are the 
constitutionally protected fundamental rights of the biological or legal parent.102  
This Part will first examine these rights and their treatment in the courts.  Next, it 
will highlight the changes in family dynamics that have resulted in challenges to 
these parental rights.  Finally, this Part will examine the treatment of de facto 
parenthood in other jurisdictions, both by the courts and by state legislatures. 
A.  Fundamental Rights and Strict Scrutiny 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee due process, and due process 
has been interpreted to include the protection of fundamental rights and liberty 
interests from government interference.103  The right to raise one’s child as he or 
she sees fit is one of these fundamental rights recognized and protected by the 
substantive component of Due Process.104  This interest was first recognized by the 
Supreme Court more than ninety-one years ago in Meyer v. Nebraska,105 in which 
the Court held that “the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause includes the 
right of parents to establish a home and bring up their children . . . .”106  The 
                                                                                                     
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. ¶ 75. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See id. 
 101.  2014 ME 59, 90 A.3d 1169. 
 102.  See supra Part III.A. 
 103.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997).  This is a distinction between 
procedural and substantive due process. While procedural due process guarantees “fair process,” 
substantive due process protects an individual’s fundamental rights from being infringed by the 
government.  See id.; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (“Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ guarantee of ‘due process of the law’ [includes] a substantive component, which forbids 
the government to infringe certain fundamental liberty interests . . . unless the interest is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“[T]he 
[Amendment] also includes a substantive component that provides heightened protection against 
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104.  Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 11, 90 A.3d 1169; see also Davis v. Anderson, 2008 ME 125, ¶ 18, 953 
A.2d 1166 (“Parents have a fundamental liberty interest to direct the care, custody, and control of their 
children.”); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (2000) ( “[T]he liberty protected by the Due Process Clause includes 
the right of the parents to establish a home and bring up children . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 105.  262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 106.  Id. at 399. 
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Supreme Court again emphasized this fundamental right two years later in Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters.107  There, the Court reiterated that the liberty of parents and 
guardians includes the right to direct the upbringing and education of children 
under their control.108  The Court further explained that “the child is not the mere 
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional 
obligations.”109  The Supreme Court confirmed this protection nineteen years later 
in Prince v. Massachusetts.110  Again, the Court stated that “[i]t is cardinal . . . that 
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first with the parents . . . .”111  
Inherent in the right to direct the upbringing of their children is the parental right to 
decide who may associate with the child.112  This is because parents are presumed 
to make decisions that are in the best interests of their child.113  This fundamental 
right continues to be recognized and protected.114 
While it is clear that the right to raise one’s child as one sees fit is a protected 
fundamental right, it is not completely protected from government interference.115  
When the government does interfere, a court must analyze that interference using 
the lens of strict scrutiny, the highest level of scrutiny.116  That is to say, the 
government must show that there is a compelling state interest and that the remedy 
is narrowly tailored to achieve that state interest.117  Generally, a State’s intrusion 
into the parent-child relationship is allowed upon some showing of an urgent 
reason or exceptional circumstance, where failure to intrude would result in harm 
                                                                                                     
 107.  268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 108.  See id. at 534-35. 
 109.  Id. at 535. 
 110.  321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 111.  Id. at 166. 
 112.  See Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 12, 761 A.2d. 291 (noting that the right to decide who may 
associate with the child is included in a parents’ protected fundamental right); Guardianship of Jewel 
M., 2010 ME 80 ¶¶ 4-5, 2 A.3d 301 (noting that fit parents act in the best interests of their child, 
including decisions regarding third-party visitation or parental rights). 
 113.  See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (stating that “[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best 
interests of their children.”). 
 114.  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (The “primary role of the parents in the 
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American Tradition.”); 
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the 
relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 
753 (1982) (discussing “the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and 
management of their child.”). 
 115.  Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 12, 90 A.3d 1169; see also Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 19, 761 A.2d 291 
(noting that a parents’ “constitutional liberty interest in family integrity is not . . . absolute, nor forever 
free from state interference.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (stating that “rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to 
some purpose within the competency of the State.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) 
(noting that fundamental rights “may not be interfered with . . . by legislative action which is arbitrary or 
without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect.”). 
 116.  See Davis v. Anderson, 2008 ME 125 ¶ 11, 953 A.2d 1166 (noting that when state actions 
interfere with a parents’ fundamental liberty interests, the State is required to demonstrate that the 
actions satisfy strict scrutiny); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (noting that when a fundamental right is 
infringed, strict scrutiny should apply) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 117.  Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 19, 761 A.2d 291 (noting that strict scrutiny requires “that the State’s 
action be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”).  
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to the child.118 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Troxel119 noted that, in making this 
determination, the best interest of the child standard alone is constitutionally 
insufficient to warrant an infringement on the parent’s fundamental right.120 
In Maine, the Law Court has recognized two instances that constitute an 
exceptional circumstance, thus justifying state interference.  First, in In Re 
Jazmine,121 the court recognized that there is a compelling state interest where harm 
to the child would result without interference from the government.122  In the 
second instance, although it has only been recognized with respect to the 
Grandparents Visitation Act,123 the court stated that the government may interfere 
where it is necessary to preserve the child’s “sufficient existing relationship.”124 
B.  Changes in Family Dynamics 
There have been significant changes in the notion and structure of the 
American family.  Once thought to be a married husband, wife, and their biological 
children, the idea of family has changed dramatically in recent years.125  There are 
several reasons for this change in family dynamics, including higher divorce rates, 
more single-parent households, and increased cohabitating heterosexual and same 
sex-couples.126   
Former Maine Supreme Court Chief Justice Wathen eloquently explained one 
reason for this change in his concurring opinion from Rideout.127  He started by 
noting that demographic changes in the recent century make speaking of the 
“average American family” very difficult.128  He also noted that the make-up of 
“families varies greatly from household to household.”129  This means that some 
families are composed of married parents, while others may be composed of single 
                                                                                                     
 118.  Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 12, 90 A.3d 1169; see also Davis, 2008 ME 125, ¶ 11, 953 A.2d 1166 
(reiterating that parents’ rights in care and control of their children should be limited only for urgent 
reasons); Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 24, 761 A.2d 291 (“[T]he natural right of a parent to the care and 
control of a child should be limited only for the most urgent reasons.”) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting that “the state has . 
. . power for limiting parental freedom . . . in things affecting the child’s welfare.”). 
 119.  530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 120.  Id. at 67-73. 
 121.  2004 ME 125, 861 A.2d 1277. 
 122.  Id. ¶¶ 14-15; see also Guardianship of Jewel M., 2010 ME 17, ¶ 12, 989 A.2d 726 (noting that 
proof that the parent is unable to meet the needs of the child would constitute an urgent reason and thus 
satisfy strict scrutiny). 
 123.  19-A M.R.S §§ 1801-1805 (2013).  
 124.  Passalaqua v. Passalaqua, 2006 ME 123, ¶ 12, 908 A.2d 1214. 
 125.  See Jason M. Merrill, Two Steps Behind: The Law’s Struggle to Keep Pace with the Changing 
Dynamics of the American Family, 11 J.L. FAM. STUD. 509, 510 (2009) (“In 1970 more than forty 
percent of families fit the traditional family definition of married parents and their biological children; 
currently less than a quarter of families fit this definition.”); Anne E. Kinsey, A Modern King Solomon’s 
Dilemma: Why State Legislatures Should Give Courts the Discretion to Find that a Child has More than 
Two Legal Parents, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 301 (2014) (“The ‘traditional’ family, in which a 
child’s parents are husband and wife, has been steadily declining for years.”).  
 126.  Merrill, supra note 125. 
 127.  2000 ME 198, 761 A.2d 291. 
 128.  Id. ¶ 37 (Wathen, J., concurring) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000)). 
 129.  Id. 
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parents or may include grandparents and other relatives.  Chief Justice Wathen, 
quoting Troxel, stated that in these “single-parent households, persons outside the 
nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to assist in the everyday 
tasks of child rearing.”130  The number of single-parent households has tripled in 
the past quarter century, and as many as sixty percent of children will live in a 
single-parent household at some point during their lives.131 
In addition, there has also been an increase in cohabitating, unmarried couples.  
In the last thirty years this number has risen from “450,000 to 4.6 million, forty-
five percent of which include children.”132  These children may be born of the 
cohabitating couple, or may be from previous relationships.  A person with no 
biological connection to a child may still form a parent-child bond in a cohabitating 
relationship. 
Another reason for the change in family dynamics is an increase in 
cohabitating same-sex couples.  The 2000 census noted that 594,000 households 
are comprised of same-sex couples.133  This increase is due, in part, to state 
recognition of same-sex marriages and domestic partnerships.134  While there is a 
clear increase in cohabiting same-sex households, the introduction of artificial 
insemination and in vitro fertilization has also lead to the change in family 
dynamics.135  Adoption used to be the only means by which same-sex couples were 
able have children.  However, the advancements in reproductive technologies allow 
same-sex couples an opportunity to have children in which fifty percent of the 
genetic make-up is contributed by one of the partners. 
All of these changes in family dynamics have created considerable challenges 
in addressing parental rights.  There is no longer a presumption that a child born to 
                                                                                                     
 130.  Id. Justice Wathen, citing Troxel, noted statistics from the U.S. Dept. of Commerce Bureau of 
Census, Current Population reports, 1997 Population Profile of the United States 27 (1998) to support 
this claim, noting that “[i]n 1996, children living with only one parent accounted for 28 percent of all 
children under the age of 18 in the United States.”  Id.  He also noted that in 1998, “4 million children—
or 5.6 percent of all children under age 18—lived in the household of their grandparents.”  Id. 
 131.  See Merrill, supra note 125, at 510; see also Barbara R. Rowe & Kay W. Hansen, Child 
Support Awards in Utah: Have Guidelines Made a Difference?, 21 J. CONTEMP. L. 195, 195 (1995) 
(“[S]ix out of every ten children born today will spend some time living in single-parent families . . . .”). 
 132.  Merrill, supra note 124, at 510; ROSE M. KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU HOUSING AND 
HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STATISTICS DIVISION, HOUSING AND HOUSEHOLD ECONOMICS STATISTICS 
DIVISION WORKING PAPER, at 1 (2010) (“In 2009 there [were] 6.7 million unmarried couples living 
together, while in 2010, there [were] 7.5 million.”). 
 133.  Merrill, supra note 125, at 510; see also DAPHNE LOFQUIST, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU HOUSING 
AND HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STATISTICS DIVISION, SAME-SEX COUPLES’ CONSISTENCY IN REPORTS OF 
MARITAL STATUS, at 4 (2012). 
 134.  See LOFQUIST, supra note 133, at 2 (reporting that in 2010 only five states, including the 
District of Columbia had same-sex marriage: Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
Vermont and the District of Columbia.  Ten states recognized domestic partnerships or civil unions: 
California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Washington, and 
Wisconsin). 
 135.  See generally Josh Deutsch, Finders-Keepers: A Bright-Line Rule Awarding Custody to 
Gestational Mothers in Cases of Fertility Clinic Error, 12 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 367, 369 (2005) 
(“Artificial insemination entails the introduction of the male’s sperm into the female’s body and 
fertilization takes place in the womb . . . . In vitro fertilization involves the fertilization of the male’s 
sperm and the female’s egg in a laboratory dish, and the resulting embryo is implanted inside the 
woman’s uterus.”). 
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a married couple is the biological child of that family.136  Further, non-biological 
parents in cohabitating households (heterosexual and same-sex) may seek an award 
of parental rights.  The introduction of new reproductive technologies has further 
complicated the determination of parental rights.137  The doctrine of de facto 
parenthood has emerged as a method by which a legal stranger, or non-biological 
parent, can obtain an award of parental rights and responsibilities.  Although the 
essence of de facto parenthood remains consistent, its treatment and requirements 
vary from state to state. 
C.  De Facto Parenthood in Other Jurisdictions 
The shift in family dynamics that has led to the development of the de facto 
parenthood doctrine is not unique to Maine.  In response to these changes, the 
application of the doctrine can be seen across the United States.  However, the 
requirements to establish de facto parenthood differ from state to state.  A look at 
some approaches taken by other states is useful.138 
In Washington, for example, the state’s Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
de facto parenthood in In re the Matter of the Parentage of L.B.139  In that case, two 
same sex partners began a relationship that lasted for twelve years.140  During that 
time, the couple decided to use artificial insemination to have a child together with 
one of the women carrying the child.141  The result of the pregnancy was a 
daughter; the couple co-parented the child sharing parental rights and 
responsibilities, until she was six years old.142  At that time, the relationship ended, 
and the biological parent cut off all of her ex-partner’s contact with the child.143  
The ex-partner then filed a petition in superior court to establish parentage.144  The 
case ultimately reached the Supreme Court of Washington, where the court was 
asked to determine whether, absent legislation, the State recognized a common law 
claim for de facto parenthood and, if so, what rights and responsibilities were 
                                                                                                     
 136.  See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989) (“[A] child born to a woman living with 
her husband is presumed to be a child of the marriage.”). This is due in large part to advances in 
technology, and now paternity testing allows for an accurate determination of whether or not a man is 
the child’s biological father.  Id. at 161 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have now clearly recognized the 
use of blood tests as an authoritative means of evaluating allegations of paternity.”); see also Little v. 
Streater, 425 U.S. 1, 7 (1981) (“[T]here is now . . . practically universal and unanimous judicial 
willingness to give decisive and controlling evidentiary weight to a blood test exclusion of paternity.” 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 137.  See Deutsch, supra note 135, at 369-70 (“Children born from donor surrogacy arrangements 
can have as many as six different parents: (1) a sperm donor; (2) an egg donor; (3) the intended mother; 
(4) the intended father; (5) the surrogate mother; (6) the surrogate mother’s husband.” (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 138.  For a more in depth look at the treatment of de facto parenthood in other jurisdictions, see 
generally Andrew L. Weinstein, The Cross Roads of a Legal Fiction and the Reality of Families, 61 ME. 
L. REV. 319 (2009). 
 139.  122 P.3d 161 (2005). 
 140.  Id. at 163-64. 
 141.  Id. at 164. 
 142.  Id.  
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
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included in such an award.145  The court ultimately concluded that such a claim did 
exist and adopted a four-part test for determining de facto parenthood.146  The 
court’s criteria are as follows:  
(1) The natural or legal parent consented to and fostered the parent-like 
relationship, (2) the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household, 
(3) the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood without expectation of 
financial compensation, and (4) the petitioner has been in a parental role for a 
length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent 
relationship, parental in nature.147 
In Delaware, legislation was passed creating a legal status of de facto 
parenthood.148  There, the legislature announced that:  
A de facto parent is established if the Family Court determines that the de facto 
parent: (1) has had the support and consent of the child’s parent or parents who 
fostered the formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship between the 
child and the de facto parent; (2) has exercised parental responsibility for the child 
as that term is defined in § 1101 of this title; and (3) has acted in a parental role for 
a length of time sufficient to have established a bonded and dependent relationship 
with the child that is parental in nature.149 
In Massachusetts, the state’s Supreme Court addressed the issue of de facto 
parenthood in E.N.O. v. L.M.M.150  In this case, two women were in a committed 
and monogamous relationship over the course of thirteen years.151  The couple 
wanted to become parents, and to that end, one of the partners became pregnant 
through artificial insemination.152  After the birth of the child, the parties executed 
an agreement stating their intent to co-parent the child.153  The couple ended up 
separating, at which time the biological partner denied her ex-partner any access to 
the child.154  Upon reaching the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the court 
held that a de facto parent is a non-legal parent that has participated in the child’s 
life as a member of the child’s family.155  With the consent and encouragement of 
the legal parent, the de facto parent resides with the child and performs a share of 
the caretaking functions at least as great as the legal parent.156  The court further 
noted that “[w]e must balance the [biological parent’s] interest in protecting her 
custody of her child with the child’s interest in maintaining her relationship with 
the child’s de facto parent.”157  
                                                                                                     
 145.  Id. at 166. 
 146.  Id. at 176.  The court’s four-part-test was drawn from the Wisconsin Supreme Court case In re 
Custody of H.S.H-K, 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995). 
 147.  In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d, at 176. 
 148.  See 77 Del. Laws 97 §§ 1-3 (2009). 
 149.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 8-201 (2015). 
 150.  711 N.E.2d, 886 (Mass. 1999). 
 151.  Id. at 888. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at 889. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  See id. at 891. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. at 893. 
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While each of these approaches seem to offer a higher threshold than the two-
part standard established in Pitts v. Moore, none of them seem to fully account for 
the constitutional rights of the parent.  However, in Part IV, borrowing on some of 
the language discussed in these jurisdictions, this Note will propose a more rigid 
bright-line rule style approach that offers clarity in this unsettled area, adequately 
accounts for the constitutional rights of the parent, and would ultimately be best for 
Maine. 
IV.  ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
With the recent and swift development of de facto parenthood, it is not 
surprising that the Law Court wished to offer clarity and guidance in this unsettled 
area of the law.  However, the new standard has muddied the waters in deciding de 
facto parenthood in Maine, and fails to adequately account for the constitutionally 
protected rights of the biological or legal parent.  The court’s desire to establish a 
standard to guide trial courts, though well intentioned, would have been more 
effective had it established something more akin to a bright-line rule.  
A.  Standards, Bright-Line Rules, and Balancing Tests 
There are several options on the judicial menu for establishing or refining the 
law.  However, whether courts should choose to employ bright-line rules, 
standards, or balancing tests has been a point of considerable debate.158  It is argued 
that rule-based jurisprudence operates “by identifying constitutional principles and 
then positing rigid safeguards against their infringement.”159  The resulting 
safeguards are essentially bright-line rules that offer predictability in the law and 
limit judicial discretion, which “fosters a sense of true equality before the law.”160  
Others have argued that while these bright-line rules provide clarity, they are often 
too rigid.  It has been argued that “formal rules . . . should coexist with balancing 
tests, because both rules and standards can generate the appropriate solution to a 
particular constitutional problem.”161  Balancing tests typically require the court “to 
weigh . . . competing clusters of facts and norms.”162  Balancing often takes place 
between some protected right and the ability of the government to regulate that 
right.163  However, critics have argued that at times this may require balancing two 
                                                                                                     
 158.  See generally James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on Bright Line-Balancing 
Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J., 773 (1995) [hereinafter Wilson Balancing]; Josh Deutsch, Finders-
Keepers: A Bright-Line Rule Awarding Custody to Gestational Mothers in Cases of Fertility Clinic 
Error, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 367 (2005); James G. Wilson, The Morality of Formalism, 33 
UCLA L. REV. 431 (1985) [hereinafter Wilson Formalism]; Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: 
Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261 (1995); Jacob D. 
Briggs, Gonzalez-Lopez and Its Bright-Line Rule: Result of Broad Judicial Philosophy or Context-
Specific Principles?, 2007 BYU L. REV. 531 (2007). 
 159.  Briggs, supra note 158, at 532. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Wilson Balancing, supra note 158, at 776. 
 162.  Id. at 805. 
 163.  Id. at 806 (“Once one concedes that particular constitutional text protects some rights but does 
not completely preclude governmental regulation, balancing has begun.”). 
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non-similar things that cannot be easily be compared.164  Often associated with 
balancing tests are standards.  Standards are “sufficiently vague to allow the 
adjudicator discretion in their implementation.”165  In constitutional law, deciding 
between standards and bright-line rules is difficult: “bright-line rules are hard to 
alter . . . but failure to create rules can diminish the Constitution’s force.”166 
While the debate on this topic continues, I believe that bright-line style rules 
are necessary when addressing constitutionally protected fundamental rights.  This 
is so for several reasons.  First, bright-line style rules promote fairness and formal 
equality.167  Rules require decision makers to be consistent in their application, and 
to treat like cases alike; “[o]n this view, rules reduce the danger of official 
arbitrariness or bias by preventing decision makers from factoring the parties’ 
particular attractive or unattractive qualities into the decision-making calculus.”168  
This approach provides a clear annunciated rule that one can point to in explanation 
of a decision, and limits discretion of decision makers that may distort the notion of 
justice.169  This is important when dealing with constitutional rights because it 
ensures that like cases will be treated alike.  Actors will know whether or not their 
fundamental rights have been violated, and how courts will treat their situation 
given the clear rule. 
A second reason is that rules offer utility and predictability.170  That is to say, 
with rules, citizens are able to order their affairs to conform to a clearly stated rule.  
While rules provide utility and predictability for private actors, they also provide 
utility and predictability for decision makers.171  In this sense, rules promote 
judicial economy because judges are not constantly engaged in “elaborate, time-
consuming, and repetitive application of background principles to facts.”172  When 
dealing with constitutional rights, it is imperative that citizens know clearly what 
rule governs, so that they know how to act and what actions violate their 
                                                                                                     
 164.  See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (noting that “[t]his process is ordinarily called ‘balancing,’ but the scale analogy is not 
really appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensurate.  It is more like judging whether 
a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”) (citations omitted). 
 165.  James G. Wilson, The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REV. 431, 435 (1985). 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62-66 
(1992) (discussing the benefits of rules in constitutional jurisprudence). 
 168.  Id. at 62. 
 169.   See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989).  
In this essay, Justice Scalia offers an interesting example of how rules promote fairness and how 
allowing discretion can distort the notion of justice.  He posits:  
Parents know that children will accept quite readily all sorts of arbitrary substantive 
dispositions— no television in the afternoon, or no television in the evening, or even no 
television at all.  But try to let one brother or sister watch television when the others do 
not, and you will feel the fury of the fundamental sense of justice unleashed . . . [a]nd the 
trouble with the discretion-conferring approach to judicial law making is that it does not 
satisfy this sense of justice very well.  When a case is accorded a different disposition 
from an earlier one, it is important, if the system of justice is to be respected, not only 
that the later case be different, but that it be seen to be so.  Id. 
 170.  See Sullivan, supra note 167 (discussing the benefits of rules in constitutional jurisprudence). 
 171.  Id. at 63; see also Scalia, supra note 169, at 1179 (“Rudimentary justice requires that those 
subject to the law must have the means of knowing what it prescribes.”). 
 172.  Sullivan, supra note 167, at 63. 
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fundamental rights. 
Finally, rules promote judicial restraint.173  Unconstrained discretion can lead 
to a disparity in results.  A case with similar or identical facts decided by one 
decision-maker may reach the opposite conclusion when decided by a different 
decision-maker.  With a lack of rules, decision-makers use their discretion in 
balancing and weighing certain facts and standards.  That is to say, decision-makers 
in administering a balancing test may impose their political or policy preferences; 
yet, with implementation of rules, courts “hedge [themselves] in.”174  As previously 
stated, this is especially important when dealing with constitutionally protected 
rights.  With rules, decision-makers are limited in imposing their own views in a 
given situation, and must apply a rule to a set of facts—providing consistency to 
those looking to have their constitutional rights protected.  While rules do inhibit 
courts to some degree, it may also embolden them when they are called to “stand 
up to what is generally supreme in democracy: the popular will.”175  When faced 
with a decision that may be unpopular, implementing such a decision becomes 
easier to administer while standing behind the shield of a clearly stated and 
established rule.176 
When dealing with constitutionally protected fundamental rights, rules are best 
because they offer predictability, clarity, utility, and promote judicial restraint.  
Unlike rules, standards and balancing tests do not promote clarity, often give too 
much discretion to decision makers, and do not offer adequate protection of the 
constitutional right.  The two-part standard adopted by the Law Court in Pitts v. 
Moore does not offer adequate protection of the biological or legal parent’s 
constitutional rights. 
B.  The Court’s Vague Two-Part Standard is Inadequate  
The vague two-part standard announced in Pitts v. Moore—that an individual 
seeking to be deemed a de facto parent must demonstrate: “(1) he or she has 
undertaken a ‘permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in 
the child’s life,’ and (2) that there are exceptional circumstances sufficient to allow 
the court to interfere with the legal or adoptive parent’s rights”177—does not 
adequately account for the parent’s constitutional rights.  This is evident because it 
lowers the bar for a showing of harm that is necessary to satisfy strict scrutiny, and 
leaves too much discretion to the decision-maker, which will lead to unpredictable 
outcomes in Maine.  The standard will ultimately muddy the waters in this area of 
the law rather than promote clarity, as the court sought to do. 
To satisfy the compelling state interest requirement in the strict scrutiny 
                                                                                                     
 173.  See Scalia, supra note 169, at 1179 (“[W]hen, in writing for the majority of the Court, I adopt a 
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2015] PITTS V. MOORE 373 
analysis, there must be a showing that harm to the child will result if the state fails 
to act.178  The plurality opinion did note that a showing of harm must be established 
by clear and convincing evidence, and required that “the child’s life . . . be 
substantially and negatively affected,” if a person satisfying the first part of the 
standard is removed.179  As the dissent noted, this seems to equate to a mere best 
interest of the child standard, which the United States Supreme Court in Troxel, 
deemed constitutionally insufficient to support judicial interference with parental 
rights.180   
The Law Court’s standard does not provide for any temporal requirement, 
which seems essential to a showing of harm.  A “temporal . . . requirement ensures 
that de facto parent claims are limited to those cases in which it is probable that the 
child has become psychologically attached to the person claiming de facto parent 
status.”181  That is to say that a temporal requirement ensures that sufficient time 
has occurred to establish a bonded parent-child relationship, and that failure to 
enforce the relationship will result in psychological harm to the child.  It is 
interesting that in each of the court’s prior decisions regarding de facto parenthood, 
the non-parent had been involved in the child’s life for at least five years,182 yet the 
plurality opinion chose to employ a concrete temporal requirement, or any form of 
temporal requirement.  The absence of a temporal requirement seems to promote 
vagueness regarding a showing of harm and ignores language from the court’s prior 
decisions in which the court required that “the nonparent [has] acted as a ‘primary 
caregiver and custodian for [the] child over a significant period of time.’”183  In 
light of this vague standard, actors will be left wondering how to conform their 
conduct, and what actions may be a permissible infringement of their constitutional 
rights. 
Further, the new standard leaves too much discretion in the hands of the 
decision-maker.  Whether a “permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible 
parental role has been established,” and what circumstances are “exceptional,” will 
all ultimately be decided at the decision-maker’s discretion.  “[The decision-maker] 
begins to resemble a finder of fact more than a determiner of law.  To reach such a 
stage is, in a way, a regrettable concession of defeat—an acknowledgment that we 
have passed the point where ‘law,’ properly speaking, has any further 
application.”184  Allowing for this discretion does not promote clarity, equality, or 
utility.  
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In order to adequately account for the parent’s constitutional rights, while also 
offering clarity in this area of law, and guidance to trial courts, the court should 
have employed a more bright-line style rule.  
C.  A Clear Bright-Line Approach for Maine 
The two-part standard announced by the Court in Pitts v. Moore is vague and 
discounts the constitutionally protected rights of the biological or legal parent.  
While public policy decisions are best addressed by the Legislature,185 the Law 
Court’s desire to implement a new test in order to offer guidance in this unsettled 
area would have been most effective had it employed a more rigid bright-line style 
rule. 
A bright-line rule is best for Maine because it provides predictability, clarity, 
ease in administration, and limits discretion regarding this fundamental right.  
Drawing on language used in other jurisdictions, a petitioner for de facto 
parenthood should have to show: (1) the biological or adoptive parent consented to 
and fostered the parent-like relationship; (2) that the petitioner has lived with the 
child in the same household for at least two years, unless the petitioner can show by 
clear and convincing evidence that a bonded and dependent relationship with the 
child has occurred; (3) that the petitioner has performed a share of the parental 
caretaking functions at least as great as the legal or adoptive parent; and (4) that the 
petitioner has undertaken a responsible parental role in the child’s life.186  Because 
an award of de facto parenthood implicates the constitutional rights of the parents, 
these showings should also be made by clear and convincing evidence.  
With any approach—bright-line rules, balancing tests, or standards—there will 
be advantages and disadvantages.187  However, the advantages of a more bright-line 
style rule outweigh the disadvantages.  While some may argue that a bright-line 
rule approach is too rigid, this approach is still best for Maine for several reasons. 
First, a bright-line style rule, such as the one proposed in this section, promotes 
equality and clarity.  Parents will know the precise elements of de facto 
parenthood, and will be able to order their conduct accordingly.  It is clear that the 
legal parent must have consented to and fostered the relationship.  There is a clear 
and concrete temporal requirement of two years that will ensure sufficient time has 
passed for a parent-child bond to occur, and therefore, it is probable that 
termination of the relationship will likely result in harm to the child.  While this 
two-year requirement is rigid, it still accounts for the possibility of exceptional 
circumstances. If a petitioning de facto parent fails the two-year requirement, but 
satisfies all other elements of the rule, he or she may establish by clear and 
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convincing evidence that such a relationship has occurred, and still be determined a 
de facto parent.  The petitioner must have engaged in a proportional share of the 
parental care-taking functions.  This again establishes that a bonded parent-child 
relationship has likely occurred and that disruption of this relationship would likely 
cause harm to the child.  A bright-line rule sets clear guidelines that must be 
satisfied before a court may interfere with a parent’s constitutional rights. 
Second, a bright-line style rule limits a decision-maker’s discretion.  This is 
important because it will offer predictability.  Under the court’s two-part standard, 
much will be left to the determination of the decision-maker, and thus, any result 
that could occur from a given set of facts will be unclear.  While the court sought to 
offer clarity in this area, allowing for this much discretion will ultimately have the 
opposite effect.  By employing a more bright-line style rule, discretion is 
significantly reduced, whereas clarity and predictability are promoted.  It is clear 
that the legal parent must have consented to the relationship; there is a clear two-
year temporal requirement; and the petitioner must have engaged in at least a 
proportional share of parental caretaking functions. With these clear and rigid 
guidelines, a court’s ability to impose its own views while interpreting a given 
situation is limited.  As a result, those whose rights are challenged could examine 
the rule, their situation, and predict the outcome with relative certainty.  This 
fosters a “sense of true equality before the law.”188 
Finally, while there is a possibility for exceptional circumstances to arise that 
may make rigid application difficult, it is of utmost importance to account for the 
constitutionally protected fundamental rights of the biological and legal parents in 
the majority of situations that will likely occur.  Although it could be argued that 
this proposed bright-line rule will fail to account for the best interests of the child, 
it should be noted that fit parents are presumed to act in the best interest of their 
child.189  Therefore, in establishing a bright-line rule that protects the fundamental 
right of parents to raise their children, the presumption that they will act in the best 
interest of their child should be respected.  Further the proposed rule includes an 
element for determining whether the petitioner has fulfilled a “responsible parental 
role.”  This will allow courts some discretion in deciding whether an award of de 
facto parenthood will be in the best interests of the child in those exceptional 
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circumstances that may arise where the other three prongs are satisfied, but 
granting parental rights and responsibilities to the petitioning parent may still result 
in harm to that child.190  
Ultimately, the proposed bright-line rule is a better choice for Maine because it 
offers clarity and predictability by imposing concrete requirements and limiting the 
decision-maker’s discretion regarding this constitutionally protected fundamental 
right.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
An award of de facto parenthood is not merely an award of visitation, but an 
award of the full panoply of parental rights and responsibilities.  As a result, such 
an award necessarily infringes on the constitutionally protected fundamental right 
of a parent to raise their child as they see fit.  The two-part standard announced by 
the Law Court in Pitts v. Moore is vague and muddies the water in this unsettled 
area of law, rather than promoting the clarity it sought to offer.  In light of the new 
two-part standard, the bright-line rule proposed in Part IV of this Note is best for 
assessing awards of de facto parenthood because it offers clarity, ease in 
administration, and predictability, while still accounting for the parent’s 
constitutionally protected fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit. 
Because the significant changes in social norms and family structures will continue 
to evolve, so too will challenges to parental rights.  In light of these continued 
changes, the bright-line rule proposed in Part IV of this Note will offer clarity and 
guidance to those deciding the question, as well as to those asking, “Are You My 
Mother?”191 
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